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RAY G. HUFFAKER* and B. DELWORTH GARDNER**

The "Hammer" Clause of the
Reclamation Reform Act of 1982
INTRODUCTION
This article considers whether the so-called "hammer" clause' of the
Reclamation Reform Act of 1982 (RRA) 2 violates constitutional due process in retroactively restructuring the terms of preenactment federal water
contracts.
The RRA restructured eighty years of reclamation law. 3 The restructuring was motivated by intense public controversy over the discrepancy
between the original 1902 Act's 4 broad social and economic development
goals and its actual implementation by the Bureau of Reclamation (Bureau). The poor financial condition of some projects, particularly the
Central Valley Project (CVP) in California, the largest of the Bureau's
projects, also fueled the impetus for reform.
Implementation of the RRA is complicated by long-term water delivery
contracts predating its enactment. Most of the existing federal water
contracts do not expire until after the year 2000.' Congress, wary of
breaking preenactment contracts outright,6 added the RRA's controversial
"hammer" clause" in a conference committee.' The clause induces water
districts with existing water contracts to voluntarily amend them into
compliance with the restructured law. Amending districts are eligible
under the RRA to receive subsidized water for up to 960 acres owned or
*Department of Agricultural Economics, University of California at Davis.
**Department of Agricultural Economics, University of California at Davis.
1. 43 U.S.C. § 390dd (1982).
2. 43 U.S.C. § 390 (1982).
3. The Reclamation Act of 1902, 32 Stat. 388, as amended by the Omnibus Adjustment Act of
1926, 44 Stat. 636 and the Reclamation Project Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 1187, constituted the body
of federal reclamation law previous to the RRA.
4. 32 Stat. 388 (1902).
5. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., Comments of the Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. on the Bureau of Reclamation's CVP Ratesetting Policy Proposal 25 (1984) [hereinafter cited
as NRDC].
6. Congress asked the Comptroller General of the United States to determine the rights water
recipients in the Westlands reclamation area have under their water contracts. The Comptroller
General's response is found in 128 CoNG. REc. S8324 (daily ed. July 15, 1982) [hereinafter cited
as Comptroller General].
7. S.CoN. REP. No. 568, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1982).
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leased but must pay the "full cost of water" 8 for leased lands in excess
of 960 acres and owned land under "recordable contract." 9 Districts not
amending before mid-1987 will receive water under a restrictive interpretation of the 1902 Act. Irrigators in non-amending water districts will
be allowed subsidized water for 160 acres owned or leased, but must pay
"full cost" for leased land in excess of 160 acres.1 0 Critics contend that
this restriction "hammers" districts into amending their water contracts
before normal dates of expiration.
The "full cost" of water is considerably higher than the subsidized
rate in many reclamation areas. 1' Thus farmers throughout the West will
have to pay substantially higher prices under the new law to irrigate their
current holdings, many of which are leased, and may therefore face
restructuring of their operations. Farmers who find it more profitable to
remain under their existing contracts can therefore be expected to attempt
to repeal the "hammer" clause.
8. The term 'full cost' means an annual rate as determined by the Secretary that shall
amortize the expenditures for construction properly allocable to irrigation facilities in
service, including all operation and maintenance deficits funded, less payments, over
such periods as may be required under Federal Reclamation Law or applicable contract
provisions, with interest on both accruing from October 12, 1982, on costs outstanding
at that date, or from the date incurred in the case of costs arising subsequent to October
12, 1982. Operation, maintenance, and replacement charges required under Federal
Reclamation law shall be collected in addition to the full cost payment.
43 C.F.R. §426.4(i) (1984).
9. "The term 'recordable contract' means a contract between the Secretary [of the Interior] and
a landowner in writing capable of being recorded under State law providing for the sale or disposition
43 U.S.C.
of lands held in excess of the ownership limitations of Federal Reclamation law.
§ 390bb(10) (1982).
10. See supra note 1.
11. See United States Dept. of the Interior, Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS), Acreage
Limitation, Westwide Report Appendix G (Full Cost Pricing Option), Table 2 (1980). The DEIS
estimated subsidized and "full cost" water rates per acre-foot for eighteen reclamation districts:
District
Black Canyon
Coachella
Columbia Basin East
Elephant Butte
Farwell
Glenn-Colusa
Goleta
Goshen
Grand Valley
Imperial
Lower Yellowstone
Lugert-Altus
Milk River
Moon Lake
Oroville-Tonasket
Truckee-Carson
Wellton Mohawk
Westlands

Subsidized Rate
$ 1.41
7.00
4.19
6.45
10.50
1.46
59.24
4.22
1.18
4.75
5.28
18.58
7.79
1.75
11.47
2.19
4.80
15.80

"Full Cost" Rate
$ 15.77
26.27
41.16
24.43
135.50
17.85
263.12
22.96
31.10
11.00
34.62
143.19
119.13
7.04
21.33
33.46
29.58
67.56
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Initially, this article traces the development of the essential elements
of reclamation law from the original 1902 Act to the RRA of 1982. Then
it analyzes the constitutionality of the "hammer" clause from the perspective of the two standards of review the United States Supreme Court
has applied to due-process challenges of retroactive legislation. Next, the
article predicts which landowners and tenants can be expected to fight
for repeal. Finally, it suggests ways that amending contract holders may
be able to use Bureau regulations to mitigate the impact of the RRA's
restrictive leasing provisions.
DEVELOPMENT OF RECLAMATION LAW
Acreage Limitation
A landowner was eligible for project water under the 1902 Act if he
did not own more than 160 acres within the project area,' 2 and resided
on or near his land.' 3 The original Act's objectives were to: (1) distribute
widely the benefits of publicly-financed reclamation projects, (2) promote
owner-operated family farms, and (3) preclude speculative gain in the
disposition of owned land over acreage limitations.' 4 The Omnibus Adjustment Act of 1926,5 an amendment to the 1902 Act, provided the
basis for administration of the 160-acre limitation by requiring recipients
with owned land in excess
of 160 acres (excess lands) to enter into
"recordable contracts"' 6 with the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary).
Owners of excess lands agreed to sell their excess within ten years for a
price reflecting the value of the land before the project was built." The
Secretary agreed to supply the excess lands with subsidized water for the
duration of the contract, usually ten years. If the excess acreage was not
sold before the end of the contract, power of attorney vested in the
Secretary to sell the land by lottery or other impartial means. The RRA
preserves the concept of the recordable contract but shortens its duration
from ten to five years.' 8
Prior to adoption of the RRA, the Bureau did not regulate leasing of
acreage receiving project water beyond prohibiting leasebacks. Leasebacks occur when buyers of excess land lease the land back to sellers as
part of the consideration for the sale transaction. Therefore, eligible federal water users applied subsidized water not only to their 160 acre
entitlements, but also to their leaseholdings, provided the corresponding
landowners were eligible to receive project water.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Act of June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 389 (1902).
Id.
See 35 Cong. Rec. 6758 (daily ed. June 13, 1902) (statement of Rep. Martin).
44 Stat. 478 (1926).
Id. at 483.
Id.
43 U.S.C. § 390ii (1982).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

(Vol. 26

Some water recipients were successful in irrigating vast landholdings
with federally subsidized water through unrestricted leasing, recordable
contracts, and the Bureau's lax enforcement of the 1902 Act's acreage
and residency requirements. Public interest groups in the mid-1970s generally contended that a stricter enforcement of the 1902 Act's requirements
was necessary to promote its still important broad social and economic
goals.' 9 Landowners argued that a stricter interpretation of the original
act would be inconsistent with modem farming practices and unfair because they decided to participate in federal projects based on past interpretations of the law.2 °
The RRA accommodated both sides by increasing the acreage limitation
but redefining it to include leased as well as owned land, 2' and abandoning
the residency requirement.22 Section 390dd of the RRA divides recipients
into "qualified recipients," entities benefitting twenty-five individuals or
less, and "limited recipients," entities benefitting more than twenty-five
individuals. 23 The former are entitled to irrigate 960 owned and leased
acres with subsidized water; the latter are entitled to 640 acres. Section
390nn excludes individual or corporate trustees from the ownership limitations.24
Repayment
The 1902 Act was not originally intended to create a system of large
subsidies.' Water users were expected to repay construction cost, not
including interest costs, within ten years. The repayments would constitute a revolving reclamation fund which would be used to finance future
projects.2l The revolving fund concept did not work out. A 1945 study
predicted that the four projects with the slowest payout records at that
time would require more than 250 years to meet the total amount repayable.27
The Omnibus Adjustment Act of 1926 significantly increased the interest subsidy by extending the original ten year repayment period to forty
years. 28 The Reclamation Project Act of 193929 also increased the subsidy
19. LeVeen, Reclamation Policy at a Crossroadsin C.J. MEYERS & A. DAN TARLOCK, WATER
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 507, 509 (2d ed. 1980).

20. Id. at 509.
21. 45 U.S.C. §390bb (1982).
22. 43 U.S.C. §390kk (1982).
23. 43 U.S.C. §390dd (1982).
24. 43 U.S.C. §390nn (1982).
25. Act of June 17, 1902, ch. 1093; 32 Stat. 388-89 (1902).
26. Id.
27. Joss, Repayment Experience on Federal Reclamation Projects, 27 J. FARm ECON. 153-67
(1945).
28. Act of May 10, 1926, ch. 277, 44(2) Stat. 453, 479 (1926).
29. 53 Stat. 1187 (1939).
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by requiring irrigators to repay only a fraction of construction costs with
the remainder being paid out of revenues for hydroelectric projects,3 ° and
authorizing the Secretary to schedule repayment on an "ability to pay"
basis.3" The Secretary also was authorized by the 1939 Act to defer
repayment of construction charges to prevent "inequitable pyramiding of
payments." 32
The 1902 Act also required recipients to pay operations and maintenance (O&M) costs.33 The failure of the CVP to reimburse O&M costs
alone, for example, has been blamed on the Bureau's method of setting
water prices under contract.3 4 Prior to 1970, water rates were set to cover
annual O&M costs and the capital repayment obligation. The major problem with the policy was that water delivery contracts did not include
provisions for rate changes. Fixed water rates, combined with greaterthan-projected inflationary increases in O&M costs, resulted in the recipients' inabilities to cover both increasing O&M costs and their capital
repayment obligations.35 Furthermore, the fixed rates were based on project feasibility study data which were five to ten years old at the time of
initial contracting. The Bureau mitigated the immediate fiscal impact of
annual operating deficits by shifting funds out of the CVP capital repayment account.36
The revised CVP rate-setting policies of the 1970s called for rates
based on current costs of service and payment capacity determinations,
and included provisions for rate modification. However, these policies
had little impact on the deteriorating financial condition of the CVP. The
revised policies applied only to newly executed contracts or existing
contracts which were renegotiated or expired. Few new contracts were
executed in the 1970s. 37 Furthermore, most significant existing contracts
expire after the year 2000.38 A Bureau rate-setting proposal in 1981 concluded that the repayment objective would "be realized by negotiating
service connew contracts and amending or renegotiating existing water
39
occurs."
opportunity
the
as
policy
[revised]
tracts under
The RRA sets out the revised repayment policy. Section 390hh provides
that water rates be at least sufficient to cover O&M charges. 4 The Sec30. 53 Stat. 1194 (1939).
31. 53 Stat. 1189 (1939).
32. 53 Stat. 1191 (1939).

33. 32 Stat. 389 (1902).
34. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, CVP Water Service Rate Policy (Draft) 5 (Jan. 8, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Bureau-Rate Policy].
35. NRDC, supra note 5, at 5.
36. Id. at 4.
37. Bureau-Rate Policy, supra note 34, at 3.
38. NRDC, supra note 5, at 25.
39. Bureau-Rate Policy, supra note 34, at 5.
40. 43 U.S.C. § 390hh(a) (1982).
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retary is also empowered under the section to make yearly modifications
in water rates necessary to cover changes in O&M costs.4 '
For the first time, water rates are tied to land tenure. Leased acreage
beyond the "qualified recipient" and "limited recipient" limitation is
irrigated at full cost under section 390ee. 2 Bureau regulations administering the RRA43 hold that full cost rates run with the leased land, thereby
ensuring that leasing will not be used to escape full cost pricing on the
landowners' excess lands." Activities not considered to be leasing under
the regulations are management or consulting agreements in which the
manager or consultant is salaried and assumes no risk in the operation
of the land, and incidental uses such as grazing or the use of crop residue
from irrigated crops grown on the land.4"
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RRA
Section 390cc restricts the RRA's implementation to subsequent "new"
contracts, and existing contracts which districts amend to receive additional benefits or to conform to the RRA. Most significant contracts
predate RRA enactment and do not expire until after the year 2000.46
Thus, the RRA will have a delayed impact unless districts can be induced
to amend their existing contracts into conformity with it. The "hammer"
clause provides such inducement. The clause states:
Within a district [which has an existing contract] that does not enter
into an amendment of its contract [for the purpose of conforming to
the provisions of this Act] ...within four and one-half years of the
date of enactment of this Act, irrigation water may be delivered to
lands leased in excess of a landholding of one hundred and sixty
acres only if full cost ...is paid for such water as is assignable to
those lands leased in excess of such landholding of one hundred and
sixty acres...'
Section 390cc also permits an individual in a non-amending district to
48
elect to be subject to the RRA by "executing an irrevocable election."
The Bureau's regulations administer the "hammer" clause by establishing the category of "recipients subject to the 160-acre ownership
limitation established by prior law." 49 This category is composed of parties
41. Id.§390hh(b).
42. Id. § 390ee(a).
43. Rules and Regulations for Projects Governed by Federal Reclamation Law, 43 C.F.R. §§ 426.1.23 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Rules].
44. Id. § 426.7(d).
45. Id. §426.7(a)(1).
46. NRDC, supra note 5, at 25.
47. 43 U.S.C. § 390cc (1982).
48. Id.
49. Rules, supra note 43, at § 426.6(d).

Winter 1986]

"HAMMER CLAUSE"

who are in water districts electing to remain under their existing contracts
and who do not make an "irrevocable election" to come under the RRA
individually. Parties who acquired their land before December 6, 1979
are allowed to own up to 160 acres in each water district. Those acquiring
their land later are restricted to 160 acres owned "westwide" throughout
the seventeen western states in which reclamation projects are located.
Land under the limit can be irrigated with subsidized water. Land leased
over the limitation is irrigated at full cost. Trust beneficiaries in this
category are restricted to an interest of 160 acres in combination with
their other holdings.
The following section considers whether the RRA's revised repayment
policy as implemented by the "hammer" clause is consistent with the
substantive due process guarantees of the federal Constitution.5"
STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
In Nebbia v. New York 5 the Supreme Court set out the typical "rational
relationship" standard of review for economic legislation: "The guaranty
of due process.., demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable,
arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and
substantial relation to the objective sought to be [obtained]." 52 The Court
presumes legislation to be constitutional and the plaintiff has the burden
to show that it is not rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.53 The Supreme Court's use of substantive due process to test the
constitutionality of economic legislation had its highwater mark in the
early part of this century and has declined ever since. 4 Recent cases
appear to show that no effective review is undertaken by.the Court.55
However, an important element distinguishing the "hammer" clause from
other economic legislation is that the federal government is party to the
contracts which the clause modified. Nowak, Rotunda, and Young conclude:
The Court has used a higher level of review to legislation that modifies the government's own contractual obligations than it does to
federal legislation that alters or regulates private contracts ...[I]t
will require more than a rational relationship between the modifying
statutes and a governmental purpose before it will sustain the measure
...[I]t will give force to its traditional bias against retroactive
50. U.S. Const. amend. V ("no person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law.").
51. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
52. Id. at 525.
53. Id.
54. J.E. NowAK, R.D. ROTUNDA & J.N. YOUNG, CONsTrrtmONAL LAw 418 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as NowAK].
55. E.L. BARNErTr & W. COHEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 539 (7th ed. 1985).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

(Vol. 26

legislation, and rely on the due process clause of the fifth amendment
56
to test the constitutionality of the impairing legislation.
The higher standard of review traditionally applied to retroactive legislation is set out below.
Justice Brennan broke with the traditional higher standard in a 1984
opinion57 holding that retroactive legislation need only meet the "rational
relationship" burden:
[t]he strong deference accorded legislation in the field of national
economic policy is no less applicable when that legislation is applied
retroactively. Provided that the retroactive application of a statute is
supported by a legitimate purpose furthered by rational means, judgments about the wisdom of such legislation remain within the exclusive province of the legislative and executive branches.5
The extent to which Justice Brennan's recent opinion will cause a
permanent shift in the standard the Court has traditionally applied to
retroactive legislation is unknown. Thus, the "hammer" clause will be
analyzed under both "rational relationship" and "higher" standards of
review. The inquiry under the higher standard of review is whether the
"hammer" clause retroactively alters Congress' own obligation under
contract and, if it does, whether such retroactivity is unconstitutional
according to a specialized due-process analysis for retroactive legislation.
Whether the clause can be categorized as retroactive legislation depends
on the authority the 1902 Act gave the 1982 Congress to regulate the
leasing of farmland receiving project water. Whether the clause is impermissibly retroactive depends on the balance the Court finds between
public and private interests. In considering whether the "hammer" clause
is rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose, the article critiques
the implicit economic assumptions underlying Congress' rationale for the
clause.
THE HIGHER STANDARD OF REVIEW: IS THE "HAMMER" CLAUSE
RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION?
Common law courts have traditionally opposed legislation with a retroactive impact as being unfair and perhaps unconstitutional.59 The federal
Constitution expressly provides against ex post facto laws 6' and state
legislation which impairs the obligations of contract. 6 The Supreme Court
has also used the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amend56. NOWAK, supra note 54, at 476-77.
57. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 2709 (1984).
58. Id. at 2718.
59. Cunningham & Kremer, Vested Rights, Estoppel, and the Land Development Process, 29
HASTINGS L.J. 660 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Cunningham].
60. U.S. Const. art I, § 9, cl. 3; § 10, cl. 1.
61. U.S. Const. art I, § 10, cl. 1.
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FIGURE 1. DEFINITION OF RETROACTIVITY.
date line
future
transactions
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3existing
after

before

obligations

enactment

ments to void retroactive legislation not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution. 62
Given the dearth of clearly defined constitutional prohibitions against

retroactive impacts, federal courts confronted with retroactive statutes
have proposed numerous tests. Modem federal courts have relied on a
variety of factors to balance the public and private interests affected by
the legislation. Hochman 63 defined a retroactive statute as "one which
gives to preenactment conduct a different legal effect from that which it
would have had without the passage of the statute. The most obvious
kind of retroactive statute is one which reaches back to attach new legal
rights and duties to already completed transactions. '
Figure 1 illustrates Hochman-retroactivity. The brackets on either end
of the "future transactions" and "existing obligations" line reflect the

fixed terms of these arrangements. A statute regulating only future transactions is prospective by definition. Regulation of existing obligations is
Hochman-defined retroactive if the transaction giving rise to the purported
obligations is completed before enactment, 65 and parties' obligations aris-

ing from completed transactions are changed after enactment.
62. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl2 ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law...").
63. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the ConstitutionalityofRetroactive Legislation, 73 HARv.
L. REV. 692, 694 (1960). Hochman stated a version of the modem "due-process" test which
Cunningham, supra note 59, at 663, reports has been explicitly adopted by a number of federal
courts.
64. Hochman, supra note 63, at 692.
65. Congress has often left courts to determine whether preenactment transactions between a
claimant and the federal government have sufficiently progressed to constitute valid existing rights
under the grandfather clauses of various natural resources acts: "Any application for preference right
leases based on [valid prospecting permits] could be adjudicated on their merits and preference right
leases issued." S. 391, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 121 CONG. REc. 26370 (daily ed. July 31, 1975).
See also Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp., 400 U.S. 48 (1970) (token assessment work insufficient to
bring plaintiff's claim under the savings clause of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act); American Nuclear
Corp. v. Andrus, 434 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Wyo. 1977) (filing of an application permit under the
Mineral Lands Leasing Act does not give rise to valid existing rights under the savings clause of
the Coal Leasing Amendments Act); Freese v. U.S., 639 F.2d 754, cert denied, 454 U.S. 827 (1981)
(plaintiff's discovery and location of claims insufficient for obtaining a patent and therefore for
protection as valid existing right under saving clause of the "Sawtooth" Act, 16 U.S.C. § 460aa
(1983)).

[Vol. 26
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FIGURE 2. TEST FOR RETROACTIVITY OF "HAMMER" CLAUSE.
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date line
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Leasing

Full-cost
Leasing

1982
enactment
of RRA

40 year water
service contracts

1987 ("hammer" clause takes effect)

Figure 2 applies Hochman-retroactivity to the "hammer" clause. Water
service contracts between the Bureau and water districts are the transactions giving rise to existing obligations.' Hochman's first condition
for retroactivity is met since the transactions giving rise to the government's existing contractual obligations were completed at the time of the
RRA's enactment. The contracts fix the maximum rate and the maximum
quantity the United States can charge and is obligated to deliver, respectively.67 The contracts also fix a term of forty years and provide for
termination on conditions specific to each district.68
Hochman's second condition is satisfied if the parties' obligations arising from completed transactions change after enactment. The "hammer"
clause takes effect in mid-1987 only for members of those districts which
do not elect to amend their existing contracts to come under the provisions
of the RRA. Under the 1902 Act these recipients are permitted to lease
and irrigate land exceeding 160 acres at a subsidized rate. Under the
"hammer" clause the recipients must pay higher rates to irrigate leased
land than they pay to irrigate owned land. Thus, a basic term of federal
water delivery contracts is substantially modified: rate setting terms are
made variable with land tenure. Existing contract holders, therefore, have
their rate terms restructured whether they amend or not.
The "hammer" clause arguably does not operate retroactively because
it invokes leasing restrictions that irrigators were already obligated to
meet under the 1902 Act. The argument that leasing restrictions were
66. Section 9(e) of the Reclamation Projects Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 1157, 1195 (1939), is the
legal authority for contracting for water service from the CVP. The Act of July 2, 1956, 70 Stat.
483 (1956), which amended § 9(e) of the RPA, assures the right of contract renewal for successive
forty-year periods.
67. The 1963 Water Service Contract with the Westlands Water District (Contract No. 14-06200-495A), for example, fixes a maximum rate of $8/acre-foot (art. 5) and a maximum delivery of
1,008,000 acre-feet/year (art. 3). The contract is reproduced in U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Special
Task Force Report on San Luis Unit, CAP, California (U.S. GPO, Stock No. 024-003-00126 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Bureau-Task Force].
68. Id. Article 2 of the Westlands Water. Service Contract provided that it be terminated if the
district did not complete distribution facilities necessary to serve all irrigable portions of the district
within five years of initial delivery.
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envisioned under the 1902 Act has been well articulated.69 Proponents
generally contend that the 1902 Act's broad social and economic development goals, as expressed in the legislative history, are best accomplished by reading the statute to restrict leasing.
Justice Mosk of the California Supreme Court applied such a method
of statutory construction in FriendsofMammoth v. BoardofSupervisors.70
His task was to define "project," a term used but not defined in the
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). He relied on a "cardinal
principle of statutory construction: that absent 'a single meaning of the
statute apparent on its face, we are required to give it an interpretation
based upon the legislative intent with which it was passed."' 7 ' Justice
Mosk concluded that "project" must be given broad meaning to be read
consistently with legislative intent that CEQA afford the fullest possible
protection to the environment.
The "legislative intent" principle of statutory construction, as illustrated in Friends of Mammoth, is used to supply meaning to unclear
statutes. "Plain meaning" is a competing cardinal principle of statutory
construction. The "plain meaning" principle holds that plain and unambiguous statutory language must be given effect.72 The 1902 Act is
not unclear regarding farmland leasing. It does not mention or allude to
leasing.73 Application of the "plain meaning" principle of statutory construction suffices to show that the original Act only regulated ownership
through the 160-acre limitation. The "legislative intent" principle should
not be used in this case to add leasing restrictions not existing in the
original statute.
Even if the "legislative intent" principle is applied, leasing restrictions
are not necessarily consistent with the intent of the enacting 56th Congress, which did not address leasing in any of the 1902 Act's legislative
history uncovered by research for this article.This is not because leasing
was an uncommon farming practice in reclamation areas in 1902." 4 Con69. Frampton, The Enforcement of FederalReclamation Law in the Westlands Water District:A
Broken Promise 13 U.CAL. DAVIS L. REv. 89, 111 (1980).
70. 8 Cal.3d 247, 104 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1972).
71. Id. at 256, 104 Cal. Rptr. 22 (quoting Benor v. Board of Medical Examiners, 8 Cal. App.
542, 546-47, 87 Cal. Rptr. 415, (1970)).
72. S. MERmiN, LAW AND THE LEGAL SYsTEM 263 (2d ed. 1982).
73. Act of June 17, 1962, ch. 1093 (1902), 32 Stat. 388. The Reclamation Act of 1902 states
that "[n]o right to the use of water for land in private ownership shall be sold for a tract exceeding
one hundred and sixty acres to any one landowner." Id. at 389. (emphasis added).
74. A 1917 study used U.S. census data to show that:
[d]uring the period from 1890 to 1900 there was a more marked increase in the
percentage of tenantry than during any other recent census period, and this applies to
all sections of the country. This was the period when the exhaustion of the public
domain began to make itself felt and when a large number of men began to [use tenant
farming as a step toward ownership]."
Spillman & Goldenweiser, Farm Tenantry in the U.S., U.S. DEPT. AGRIC. Y.B. 1916 at 32146
(1917), reprinted in RASMUSSON, AGRIcULTURE IN THE UNrrED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY

2001 (1975) [hereinafter cited as RASMUSSON].

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 26

temporaneous congressional debate over the 1902 Act indicated great
concern over the specter of private land monopoly. Representative Newlands (Nevada), who introduced the House bill, argued that public development of irrigation water was necessary to prevent the land monopoly
which would accompany private water development-since the latter
would not be profitable without getting control of large areas of land.75
Leasing was probably not mentioned because Congress believed that
disposal of public land in tracts of 160 acres, along with public water
development, was sufficient to prevent private monopolization of irrigated
land. Newlands argued, after explaining how the Mexican land grant
system had "steadily retarded the progress and development" of California, that Iowa had not suffered similarly because it "was entered up
in tracts of 160 acres." 7 6 The final bill, which passed both Houses by
wide margins, only included the 160-acre ownership restriction.
Furthermore, leasing was viewed in the first quarter of the century as
a stepping stone toward ownership, not as a desirable alternative to ownership. " Leasing may not have been restricted under the 1902 Act because
it expanded the number of farmers beyond those owning land. The 56th
Congress could have reasonably believed that leasing was consistent with
the 1902 Act's social and economic development goals.
Finally, Senate debate over the defeated Exon amendment to the RRA,
which would have prohibited unlimited leasing even at full cost, demonstrates that 1982 lawmakers disagreed about their predecessor's intent
regarding leasing restrictions under the old Act. Nebraska Senator Exon
contended, "[a]lthough no specific provisions of the 1902 reclamation
law addresse[d] the issue of leasing, it was the intention of the law that
the acreage limitation not be circumvented through this device." 7 On
the other hand, Idaho Senator McClure urged that "[t]here is unlimited
leasing under the present law [1902 Act]." 79
Conclusion: Retroactivity
The preceding argument supports a finding that the "hammer" clause
satisfies the second condition for Hochman-retroactivity; namely, that
parties' obligations arising from completed transactions are changed after
enactment. The clause alters Congress' contractual obligation by tying
previously fixed water rates to land tenure through leasing restrictions.
75. 35 CONG. REc. 841 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1902) (statement of Rep. Newlands).
76. Id.
77. RASMUSSON, supra note 74. See also EMERICK, AN ANALYSIS OF AGRICULTURAL DISCONTENT
INTHE UNrrED STATES, 616 (1897) ("farm tenants are most numerous where the conditions are most
favorable to their becoming farm owner.").
78. 128 CONG. REC. S8466 (daily ed. July 16, 1982) (statement of Sen. Exon).
79. Id. at S8469.
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There is no statutory authority under the 1902 Act for imposing these
restrictions. The clause, therefore, should be found retroactive.
IS THE "HAMMER" CLAUSE IMPERMISSIBLY RETROACTIVE?
Retroactive legislation is constitutional under a higher standard of review if the public interest served by applying the legislation retroactively
outweighs the harm to private interests.8 0 Private interest factors considered in the constitutional analysis are the nature and strength of rights
affected and the extent of the abrogation of those rights.8" The nature and
strength of the public interest served depends on whether the retroactive
legislation is categorized as curative, emergency, or general. The categorization determines the extent to which private interest factors are
allowed to be weighed against public interest factors. Public interest
categorization of the "hammer" clause will therefore be discussed first.
The Public Interest: Curative Legislation
Hochman defines curative statutes as those designed retroactively to
cure defects in an administrative system.82 The Supreme Court, in dealing
with curative statutes, has developed an irrebuttable presumption that the
public interests served are not outweighed by the undesirable retroactive
consequences.8 3 Thus, any retroactive legislation falling into this category
is per se valid.
The three "curative statute" cases Hochman studied are distinguishable
from the "hammer" clause situation. In ParaminoLumber Co. v. Marshall," the Court held that an employer was not denied due process when
Congress directed review of a compensation order under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act after the normal time for
review had expired. Congress allowed the case to be reopened when it
appeared that the claimant's injuries were more severe than reported by
the employer's physician-whose report formed the basis of the earlier
award. 85 The Court stressed that no new obligations were imposed on the
employer.86
In Graham & Fosterv. Goodcel 87 a curative statute was permitted to
remedy the Internal Revenue Commissioner's mistake in allowing the
statute of limitations to run on certain tax claims. The Court stated a
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Hochman, supra note 63, at 693-95.
Id.
Id. at 704.
Id. at 701.
309 U.S. 370 (1940).
Id. at 376.
Id. at 378.
282 U.S. 409 (1931).
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general rule applicable to curative statutes: "Where the asserted vested
right, not being linked to any substantial equity, arises from the mistake
of officers purporting to administer the law ... the legislature is not
prevented from curing the defect in administration. .. 88
Finally, Chief Justice Holmes held that the legislature should be able
to make "small repairs" to cure inadvertent defects in statutes or their
administration. 9 The three cases seem to limit application of the irrebuttable presumption to curative statutes which, (1) although formulated
retroactively, do not impose new obligations on the regulated parties and
(2) make small procedural-type repairs.
The RRA concededly seeks to cure problems arising under the old
reclamation laws. However, the circumstances surrounding the RRA are
distinguishable from the three cases above. First, as argued above, the
clause imposes a new obligation-full cost rates for irrigating excess
leased land--on nonamending water service contract holders. Second,
the clause does not make a small procedural-type repair in the administration of reclamation law. Congress, in the cases cited by Hochman, did
not act to change the substantive law. Rather, Congress changed procedure
to allow for the just application of the substantive provisions. The "hammer" clause, on the other hand, entails a large repair to the substantive
provisions of the old reclamation law. Districts unwilling to amend preexisting government contracts are refused subsidized water for excess leased
acreage for the first time in reclamation history. As argued above, this
represents a change in contractual obligation and not a change in the
Bureau's enforcement of the 1902 Act. Restructured contractual water
rate terms do not represent a small repair considering that full cost rates
are expected to be significantly greater than existing contractual rates,
many operators lease significantly beyond their 160 acre limitation, and
the majority of important contracts predate the RRA's enactment.
The Public Interest: Emergency Legislation
Hochman's studies led him to conclude that: "when the legislature acts
to remedy serious substantive evils resulting from an emergency situation,
the Supreme Court is more likely to be sympathetic to retrospective
legislation."' Hochman illustrated this point with Supreme Court decisions sustaining depression legislation limiting the right to withdraw subscriptions in building and loan associations9" and affording relief to
mortgagors in arrears with their payments.92
88. Id. at 429.
89. Danffrth v. Grotop Water Co., 178 Mass. 472, 477, 59 N.E. 1033, 1034 (1901) (Holmes,

c.J.).

90. Hochman, supra note 63, at 698.
91. Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n., 310 U.S. 32 (1940).
92. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
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The "hammer" clause is not a congressional reaction to an emergency
situation. First, the poor financial condition of federal reclamation projects
is not nearly as devastating as the Great Depression of the 1930s. Second,
Congress probably would not have waited to reform reclamation law until
President Reagan was elected if it viewed the situation as an emergency.
Finally, the legislative history of the RRA does not indicate that Congress
thought that an emergency existed.93
The Public Interest: GeneralRetroactive Legislation
In the majority of retroactive-legislation cases, Hochman found that
the legislative purpose was neither curative nor intended to alleviate
emergency conditions.' When the Court confronts general retroactive
legislation it considers (1) the strength of the public interest served by
the legislation and (2) whether the legislation must be retroactive to
achieve its public purpose.95
The "hammer" clause serves a strong public interest in the speedy
implementation of a comprehensive regulatory scheme. Both water interests and public interest groups requested Congress to restructure reclamation laws. Congressional efforts to reconcile both interests will have
limited current effect if the large number of long-term existing contracts
are not amended to comply with its provisions. The "hammer" clause
induces this compliance. Legislation must clearly be designed retroactively to reach existing contracts.
However, the public interest in speedy implementation of the new
reclamation program is inconsistent with another important and longstanding public interest, that of recognizing valid rights created under the
previous statutory regime. 96 Congress recently rejected retroactive legislation and recognized valid existing rights in enacting the Coal Leasing
Amendments of 1975. 97 Some of the reasons for the amendments were
strikingly similar to those for reforming the 1902 Act.9" The previous
coal leasing program was undermined by speculation,99 coal leasing was
93. The legislative history does not show Congress rushing to put together an emergency reclamation law. Rather, it shows Congress carefully pounding out a compromise between updating the
1902 law and respecting its fundamental social policies. See debates over Amendment 1935 (acreage
limits on which partial and full construction costs are paid, S8314-48); Amendment 1937 (reduce
ownership and leasing acreage allowances from those suggested in proposed bill, S8464-71); Amendment 1094 (apply "full" cost pricing on certain Corps of Engineers projects, S8473-87); and Amendment 1095 (retain the residency requirement, S8489-95) in 128 CONG. REc. (daily eds. July 15-16,
1982).
94. Hochman, supra note 63, at 700.
95. Id. at 701.
96. See supra note 65.
97. 90 Stat. 1083 (1975).
98. See H.R. RaP. No. 681, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
99. Id. at 14.
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highly concentrated,'" and the government was not receiving a fair return
from its tenants.'' Despite these grave problems of exploitation of important national resources, Congress stressed the public policy of recognizing valid existing rights in the 1975 amendments. 0 2
The Private Interest: The Nature of the Right Affected
Hochman's study showed that the Court considered the following issues
important: (1) whether the right has been asserted and enforced prior to
enactment of the statute; (2) whether the asserted right is against the
legislating authority; and (3) whether the asserted right is linked to a
"substantial equity.""
Consider the first issue. A letter from the Comptroller General of the
United States to the Acting Chairman of the Westland Hearings in the
Senate indicates the strength of the rights asserted by water districts."
The Comptroller General was asked to "study the question of which
rights are vested in the landowners in the district with respect to the
Westlands contract."' The Comptroller General was also asked whether
(1) the Secretary or Congress could unilaterally change water rates and
(2) there were any other means by which Congress could recover a portion
of the subsidy.' 06
The Comptroller General responded:
[1]andowners in Westlands may be regarded as having a vested interest in the rate specified in the water service contracts, since neither
past nor future rates may be changed [unilaterally by the Secretary
or Congress] without the consent of Westlands ...nor are we aware
of any other unilateral method by which the United States might
recover such subsidy. 107
A different conclusion was arrived at in another study.0 8 The study
contended that a 1977 9th Circuit decision"° held that federal water project
beneficiaries do not have vested property rights in federal water. A second
look at the case reveals that the study may have drawn the wrong conclusion.
In Israel v. Morton,"' plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment affirming
his right to (1) sell excess land at an unrestricted price with (2) assurance
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 15.
Id.at 17.
121 CONG. REC. 26370 (1975).
282 U.S. at 109.
Comptroller General, supra note 6.
Id.at S8324.
Id.
Id.at S8324-25.
Frampson, supra note 69, at 111-12.
Israel v. Morton, 549 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1977).
Id.
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that the land would carry the right to receive project water if sold to a
farmer under the limit."' The Columbia Basin Project Act of 1937112
established the reclamation project covering Israel's land. The Act was
amended in 1943"' to limit service to 160 acre irrigation blocks." 4 Recipients were required under the Act to enter into recordable contracts
for both their excess and non-excess lands. They contracted not to sell
any of their land for a price in excess of the Secretary's appraised value
for a period of five years after initial delivery.
The plaintiff Israel owned both excess and non-excess land in the project
area. His excess land was never entitled to and never received project
water. The five year sales moratorium for his excess land terminated
December 31, 1960. Unfortunately for Israel, an amendment' ' providing
that the Columbia project was to be governed by federal reclamation laws
became effective before he could sell his land. The amendment extended
the moratorium on unrestricted sales to the time when one-half of the
project construction charges were paid. "6
Israel contended that once the five-year moratorium had passed he
became vested with the unrestricted right to sell his excess lands along
with entitlements to project water. The court disagreed, reasoning that:
Project water ... would not exist but for [development] by the
United States. It is not there for the taking [unlike appropriation]
... but for the giving by the United States. The terms upon which
it can be put to use, and the manner in which rights to continued
use can be acquired, are for the United States to fix." 7
Israel is distinguishable from the present situation. The "hammer"
clause, by definition, affects landowners in reclamation project areas who
also hold valid federal water service contracts. Israel did not hold a water
service contract for his excess land. Israel was in the extremely weak
position of demanding federal water without a contract in an effort to sell
land around the new amendment.
The court" 8 held that the United States (1) does not have to sell water
to anyone and (2) may fix the terms of usage when it sells water. In other
words, landowners without water service contracts do not have vested
rights in project water. The court did not hold that the United States is
free to renounce the agreement once it decides to sell water at given
terms.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 129.
Columbia Basin Projects Act, 16 U.S.C. § 835 (1982).
57 Stat. 14 (1943).
Id. at 15.
76 Stat. 677 (1962).
Id. at 678.
549 F.2d 132 (9th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 132-33.
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Consider now the second issue. Hochman found that the Court has
tended to apply a stricter standard to statutes abridging rights against the
government."1 9 The stricter standard likely reflects the Court's belief that
it is more inequitable to permit a party to a contract to modify its terms
than for the legislature, as a disinterested body, to alter private contractual
rights. Congress, through the "hammer" clause, unilaterally modified
the terms of contracts to which it is party.
Consider the third issue. An asserted right is based on "insubstantial
equity" if it was created contrary to the party's bona fide expectations at
the time the contract was formed.12 Did irrigators rely in good faith upon
representations made by regulators to incur the extensive leasing obligations existent in reclamation areas? Regulators' statements regarding
leasing were as inconsistent as those made by Congress. The Associate
Solicitor issued an opinion in 1970 stating "[l]arge scale leasing operations wherein the right of control of the owner-lessor largely is passed
to the lessee, are not questioned.". 1 The Commissioner of Reclamation,
testifying in 1976 before the House Subcommittee on Water and Power,
stated:
In regard to leasing of land, reclamation law imposes no restrictions
on the leasing of privately owned project lands. Consequently, an
individual operator may lease a number of non-excess landholdings
and farm several tracts as a single farming operation as long as the
lessee does not acquire control over the land for a long period of
time. "'
Finally, Secretary of the Interior Andrus, testifying in 1978 before the
Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, stated: "[1]easing
has become perhaps the principal vehicle for frustrating the intent of
reclamation law. In too many cases it has provided1 2the
haven for the
3
nonresident investor-farmer and the land speculator."
Tenants arguably could have relied on these inconsistent statements in
operating large leaseholds. First, the commissioner's statement shows
that the agency believed leasing to be unrestricted under the 1902 Act.
The policy was presumably known to his agency and represented to
customers. Second, Secretary Andrus admitted in committee that corporations that had entered into recordable contracts with the Secretary
were in compliance with the law notwithstanding large scale leasing.124
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Hochman, supra note 63, at 723.
Id. at 720.
Bureau-Task Force, supra note 67, at 312, 313.
Id.
Andrus, quoted in Frampton, supra note 69, at 29.
See 128 CONG. REc. H1885 (daily ed. May 6, 1982) (statement of Rep. Pashayan).
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Finally, the Bureau had already banned leasebacks as the most flagrant
use of leases to circumvent the excess land provisions of the law."2
Private Interest Factors:The Extent of the Abrogation of the Asserted
PreenactmentRight
Hochman found that: "[Supreme Court] cases clearly indicate that the
closer a retroactive statute comes to extinguishing the substance of a
preexisting right through destruction of the legal incidents of that right,
the less likely is the Court to sustain the application of the statute."' 26
The "hammer" clause will not completely extinguish the vested rights
recipients have in the price terms of their existing contracts. They will
still receive subsidized water for their 160-acre allotment. However, the
"hammer" clause may, in tying rate structure to land tenure, destroy a
legal incident of the right-paying a flat contractual rate for all water
delivered-by abrogating subsidized excess leasing in existing contracts.
Existing contracts do not tie the flat rates charged to the tenure of the
land upon which the water is applied. Eligible land (owned land below
160 acres or under recordable contract, and all leased land not excess to
the landowner) receives subsidized water; ineligible land receives none
at all.
The "Higher" Standard of Review: Conclusion
The "hammer" clause is arguably unconstitutional retroactive legislation. Water districts have vested rights in the rate setting terms of their
existing federal contracts. In enacting the "hammer" clause Congress
disregarded the strong public interest in recognizing these valid existing
rights. Protection of this interest recently controlled Congress' decision
not to attach a "hammer" type clause to the Coal Leasing Amendments
of 1975. The conference committee report giving birth to the "hammer"
clause does not explain why this public interest did not predominate in
the new reclamation legislation.
Finally, Congress is party to contracts creating the rights it abrogates
via the "hammer" clause. Congress' decision to extend repayment contracts to forty years is the major source of the RRA's implementation
problem. In fairness, Congress should not be allowed to solve a problem
of its own creation by reneging on the rate setting terms of its contracts.
The federal government's private contracting partners should not be compelled to "bail out" of valid federal contracts.
125. Bureau-Task Force, supra note 121, at 313.
126. Hochman, supra note 63, at 714.
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THE "RATIONAL RELATIONSHIP" STANDARD OF REVIEW
The "rational relationship" standard of review, recently applied by
Justice Brennan to retroactive legislation in Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co. , 7 requires only that the retroactive application
of the "hammer" clause be rationally related to a legitimate government
purpose.'28 The "hammer" clause is retroactively applied by imposing
farmland leasing restrictions on nonamending preenactment contractees.
The rapid implementation of a comprehensive regulatory scheme is concededly a legitimate government purpose. However, the existence of a
legitimate government purpose is only the beginning of the inquiry. Retroactive leasing restrictions can be upheld only if they are reasonably
designed to implement the RRA. The conference report giving birth to
the "hammer" clause uncovers Congress' rationale for designing the
clause with retroactive farmland leasing restrictions:
The bill approved by the conference committee also reduces the
subsidy for leased lands in those districts not amending their contracts. The conferees agreed that the larger farming operations in
such districts which lease lands over and above the basic ownership
limitation of 160 acres should not, in the future, receive the subsidy
benefit for the additional leased lands. 29
In sum, the committee believed that imposing farmland leasing restrictions
on nonamending contract holders is reasonable because they do not deserve the subsidy benefit for their leased lands in excess of the 1902
ownership restriction. The committee's reasoning is based on two implicit
assumptions concerning the agrarian economy of reclamation areas: (1)
the project benefits that participants receive equal the reclamation subsidy;
and (2) farmland lease markets always operate to give project benefits to
large-tenant farm operations.
Assumption 1: The Project Benefits that ParticipantsReceive Equal the
Reclamation Subsidy
Irrigators may not capture nearly so great a proportion of the reclamation subsidy as Congress thinks. Irrigators capture the difference between what the federal water is worth to them in production and what
they pay to use it, defined here as "economic rents." Irrigators do not
capture the difference between project water costs to the government and
what is collected in water fees, usually defined as the "subsidy." There
is no necessary economic relationship between the value of the water to
irrigators and the cost to the government of providing it. Therefore,
irrigators do not necessarily capture the entire subsidy. In fact, usually
127. U.S.-., 104 S. Ct. 2709 (1984).
128. Id. at 2718.
129. Senate Report, supra note 7, at 30.
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they capture only a fraction of it. To require irrigators to repay benefits
not received is unreasonable and, in fact, may be impossible unless the
economic rents approach the magnitude of the subsidy.
What happens to the difference between project costs and the value of
the water to irrigators? The difference is a taxpayer loss because of the
inefficient scale at which projects with financial problems were built
initially. For example, a study shows that a public investment of over
$2200 per acre in the Westlands Water District created benefits of less
than $1000 per acre. 3 ' Thus, more -than half the public cost is lost to
inefficiency, a foregone capital cost and not a gain irrigators capture by
their variable water use.
Assumption 2: FarmlandLease Markets Always Operate to Leave
ProjectBenefits in the Hands of Large-Tenant Farm Operations
Whether the "hammer" clause's leasing restrictions are needed to strip
away undeserved project benefits from large tenants in nonamending water
districts depends on the performance of farmland lease markets in transferring project benefits from tenants to the landowners. If, for instance,
landowners receive the bulk of project benefits in leases, leasing restrictions cannot spread total benefits significantly better than ownership restrictions. If, on the other hand, tenants secure a significant portion of
the benefits, leasing resrictions can discourage their transfer to tenants.
Congress apparently automatically assumed that reclamation area leasing
markets operate in the latter fashion.
Determining the performance of regional farmland lease markets, however, is an empirical task, not an automatic assumption. Contrary to
Congress' assumption, a study of the Imperial Valley, a reclamation area
with underpriced water, extensive leasing, and a wide size distribution
of tenants, showed that it had lease markets capable of transferring the
bulk of project benefits to landowners. 3' A survey was taken from twentyfive tenants participating in 156 cash and 45 share leases. Tenant's expected economic rents from leasing were estimated from survey information and compared to the actual market rates they paid to landowners.
Landowners in the sample captured 92 percent of total rents in both cash
and share leases.' 3 2 Thus, the results showed that a broad distribution of
130. Leveen, Some Economic Implications of the Current and Possible Future Administration of
the Reclamation Act of 1902 (1978) (unpublished working paper, Dept. of Agric. & Resource Econ.,
Univ. of Calif., Berkeley).
131. Huffaker & Gardner, The Distribution of Economic Rents Arising from Subsidized Water
when Land is Leased (forthcoming in AM. J. AGcRC. ECON. 1986).
132. The study tested the null hypothesis that landowners capture full economic rents in cash and
share leases. Acceptance intervals were calculated by setting the probability of a type I error
(incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis) at 0.005. The 92 percent of total rents captured by both
cash and share landowners was not significantly different from 100 percent given acceptance intervals
estimated to be [83 percent, 117 percent] and [82 percent, 118 percent] respectively.
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the benefits of underpriced water is most effectively promoted, at least
in the Imperial Valley reclamation area,' 33 by limiting the size of owned
acreage and not the size of the sum of owned and leased acreage as
required by the RRA.
"RationalRelationship" Standard of Review: Conclusion
The conference committee implied that retroactive leasing restrictions
are a reasonable inducement because large nonamending tenants do not
deserve the subsidy benefit for their excess leased lands. The committee's
implicit assumption that tenants receive benefits equal to the reclamation
subsidy is unreasonable since economic rents, not subsidy, are capitalized
to some extent in lease values. The committee's over-estimation of the
benefits available for tenant capture caused it to overshoot in specifying
reasonable leasing restrictions in the "hammer" clause. The clause's 160acre restriction on nonamending farmers is much tighter than that considered necessary in the RRA for viable modem farming. Thus, the clause
unnecessarily burdens these farmers. The "hammer" clause's severe leasing restriction is also unreasonable because the available evidence indicates that landowners, not tenants, capture the bulk of project benefits in
leasing.' 34
WHO WILL WORK FOR REPEAL OF THE "HAMMER" CLAUSE?
Farming interests can be expected to fight for repeal of the "hammer"
clause given the substantially higher prices they will have to pay if the
clause is implemented. Thus, it becomes relevant to discuss who will
favor it and who will not. Whether certain landowners and tenants amend
their contracts to come under the RRA, or remain under the 1902 Act
and fight for repeal of the "hammer" clause, depends on which law they
anticipate will benefit them most. Anticipated benefits may depend largely
on the following factors:
The RRA's Effect on Expected Economic Rents
The previously cited finding' 35 notes that landowners may capture the
bulk of the economic rents in leasing. This implies that lease prices paid
133. Using the Imperial Valley as a case study has the shortcoming that it has been exempt from
acreage limitations for all but a very brief recent period. Thus, the leasing agreements studied may
not be fully representative of those in other reclamation areas fully subject to the law. Imperial
Valley operators would not, for example, have the same incentives to engage in "sweetheart" leaseback arrangements to overcome acreage restrictions as those living under acreage restrictions. Despite
its exclusion from acreage restrictions on ownership or leasing, the Imperial Valley study is noteworthy because it offers evidence that a farmland leasing market can be competitive in a reclamation
area characterized by large tenants.
134. It appears that a farmland lease market study has not been attempted in any other reclamation
area.
135. Huffaker & Gardner, supra note 131.
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to landowners may decrease almost proportionately with the reduction in
economic rents caused by an increase in water prices, i.e., by an increase
in O&M water charges or the payment of full cost.
The Size of Landowners and Tenants in the Relevant GeographicLease
Market
Bureau regulations ensure that landowners and tenants will not misuse
leasing to escape full cost pricing. 36
' Thus, if a landowner rents out land
subject to full cost, the full cost rate still applies even if the land is not
excess vis-a-vis the lessee and vice-versa.
The Individual Farm Size Relative to Acreage Limitations of Each Law
Consider first those landowners who receive subsidized federal water
but are not farm operators. Suppose they find themselves in lease markets
characterized by tenants who do not exceed the 960 acre limitation of
the new law. Suppose further the landowners have more than 960 acres
that they lease. Under the old law, they have to dispose of acreage
exceeding 160 acres. Under the new law they may own and lease out
960 acres. Thus, these landowners may prefer the new law.
Consider next landowners who have complied with the 160 acre limitation of the old act. This is probably the most common situation over
the entire western United States where reclamation law applies. Under
the new law these landowners can pay sales prices for land, and offer
leases, reflecting their eligibility to receive subsidized federal water up
to the 960 acre limit. Their sales bids might well be greater than those
which landowners holding more than 960 acres can offer. Thus, smaller
landowners may find their competitive position in both land sales and
leasing markets enhanced under the new law relative to landowners that
exceed the 960 acre limitation. They might therefore support the "hammer" clause which would induce their larger competitors to amend their
contracts.
Suppose now that the above landowners are located in areas characterized by large tenants who exceed the 960 acre operating limitation.
Economic rents and lease prices may be higher under the old law than
if full cost prices must be paid for water delivered to land over 960 acres
as required under the new act. Landowners amid large tenants may thus
prefer nonamended contracts and repeal of the "hammer" clause that
would force them to amend.
Consider, finally, tenant preferences for reclamation law. Tenants operating below 960 acres may be able to offer greater lease prices, depending on the strength of economies of scale, than those operating above
960 acres, since the latter must pay full cost for water on land in excess
of 960 acres as required under the new law. Thus, tenants of lesser acreage
136. 43 C.F.R. 426.7(d).
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may find their competitive positions enhanced under the new law relative
to tenants who exceed the 960 acre limitation. They might support the
"hammer" clause to cause amendment of their larger competitors' contracts. Tenants of under 960 acres, who lease from large landowners and
must use full cost water, may join larger acreage tenants in preferring
the old law, especially if the "hammer" clause is repealed.
A complication is that most tenants are also landowners who farm on
whatever owned acreage is allowed under the relevant reclamation law.
As owner-operators they may profit from an expansion of owned acreage
with subsidized water permitted under the RRA, especially if they are at
the end of their recordable contract. For them the wealth gain produced
by the expanded acreage provisions of the RRA may be greater or less
than the wealth loss produced by the increased water rates under the
"hammer" clause.
In sum, only those small tenants and landowners who are not likely
affected by the full cost provisions of the RRA will be apt to benefit from
implementation of the "hammer" clause, since it will induce their larger
competitors to amend contracts and force them to pay more for water.
However, even small tenants or landowners may be gravely hurt by the
"hammer" clause if their regional lease market is characterized by landowners over the limit or tenants over the limit, respectively.
MITIGATING THE IMPACT OF AMENDING CONTRACTS
If attempts to repeal the "hammer" clause fail, irrigators of all sizes
may have several means under the Bureau's new regulations to mitigate
the impact of amending their contracts to come under the restrictive
leasing provisions of the RRA.
They can enter into section 426.7(2) management or consulting agreements in lieu of conventional leases.'3 7 These are agreements "in which
the manager or consultant performs a service for the landowner for a fee
but assumes no risk in the operation of the land. ."138 Small landowners
surrounded by large tenants, for example, may benefit more from management agreements than conventional leases. The managed land is not
counted against the manager's own entitlement and is thus eligible for
subsidized water. Landowners benefit from increased rents due to lower
water costs. However, landowners absorb more production risk in paying
managers a cash rate. Thus, landowners have to soak up bad years. Their
willingness to do so depends on the difference between full cost and
subsidized water rates, and how the difference translates into increased
rents.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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Trusts are another vehicle to mitigate the restrictive leasing provisions
of the RRA. The advantage of a trust is that it is exempted from the full
cost pricing and ownership limitations of the RRA:
The ownership and full cost pricing limitations of this title and the
ownership limitations provided in any other provision of federal
reclamation law shall not apply to lands in a district which are held
by an individual or corporate trustee in a fiduciary capacity for a
beneficiary or beneficiaries whose interests in the lands served do
not exceed the ownership and pricing limitation imposed by federal
reclamation law, including this title.' 39
The use of trusts to avoid the restriction provisions of the RRA was
anticipated by one respondent at the public hearings held by the Bureau
of Reclamation in the formulation of their regulations. The respondent
"suggested that the rules should not allow trusts to become the means
by which the RRA can be circumvented. "" The Bureau justified its rule
by answering that it was a restatement of the conditions set forth in the
RRA concerning trusts.
The benefits which a farm operator creates by changing his operation
into a trust depends upon farm size and the tax and liability benefits of
the current organizational structure relative to those of a trust. Consider,
for example, a sole proprietor of a federally irrigated farm which is
significantly larger than the 960 acre limitation of the RRA. The farmer,
by placing his excess land in trust, does not have to put it under a
recordable contract. Each remaining family member can become the beneficiary of 960 acres of excess land, assuming each does not have other
interests in federally irrigated land. The farmer-settlor can continue to
control the operation of the former excess land and collect a salary by a
"declaration of trust" in which he declares himself trustee. A declaration
of trust will generally be recognized if the settlor sufficiently manifests
a desire to create a trust. Such desire can generally be shown through
notice to a third person of the trust's existence and separate bookkeeping
of each beneficiary's interest. Alternatively, an independent trustee can
hire the farmer-settlor to operate the trust farmland as a manager or
consultant.
The disadvantage of placing excess land in trust is that the land can
be lost if sold by beneficiaries or reached by their creditors. The land is
also lost if sold pursuant to a recordable contract, but at least the farmer
receives the non-project value. The danger may be mitigated if the farmer
can set up some type of "constrained" trust, such as a revocable trust
(settlor retains power to revoke the trust); a spendthrift trust (beneficiaries
139. 43 U.S.C. § 390nn (1982).
140. 43 C.F.R. 426.6(b)(4).
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cannot sell the trust land and creditors cannot reach it for satisfaction of
claims against beneficiaries); or a discretionary trust (trustee has discretion
to withhold income so that beneficiaries do not have a right to it that
creditors can reach).
Consider, now, a general farm partnership. Partnerships are limited to
irrigation of 960 acres with subsidized water. Converting the partnership
to a trust allows each partner-turned-beneficiary to hold an interest in 960
acres. There are also liability advantages to a trust over a partnership.
Under the law of general partnerships, each general partner is subject to
unlimited liability on all debts and liabilities of the partnership. The
creditor of a beneficiary, on the other hand, can generally reach only that
beneficiary's equitable interest in the trust.
Farm corporations with over twenty-five shareholders are limited to
640 acres under the RRA, only 320 of which can be irrigated with
subsidized water. Rather than put excess land under recordable contract
and pay full cost for half of its owned land and all of its leased, the
corporation may possibly convert into a trust with shareholders-turnedbeneficiaries. The new trust can irrigate a tremendous amount of acreage
at the subsidized rate since the RRA puts no limit on the aggregate size
of the trust.
Farm corporations with over twenty-five shareholders also have the
option of reducing the number of their shareholders to twenty-five. This
makes them eligible to receive subsidized water for 960 acres instead of
only 320. They may still enjoy the advantages of corporate structure.
CONCLUSION
The "hammer" clause acts retroactively to restructure the rate setting
clauses in contracts predating the RRA. Rate setting clauses in existing
contracts set a fiat charge for all water delivered. When the "hammer"
clause is implemented the rate setting clauses will be restructured to tie
water rates to land tenure. Irrigators will be required to start paying full
cost for water on excess leased land.
The 1902 Act does not explicitly authorize restrictions on leasing.
However, such a change may be justified, and may not change irrigators'
legal obligations, if the 1902 Act was intended to regulate leasing. It
appears that the 56th Congress did not intend to regulate leasing because
of the following reasons: (1) leasing is not mentioned in the legislative
history; (2) the specter of private land monopoly was likely believed to
be sufficiently handled by the 160 acre ownership limitation; and (3)
leasing, at the turn of the century, was viewed as a stepping stone to
ownership and thus a practice which may have been consistent with the
intent of the law.
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"HAMMER CLAUSE"

Whether the "hammer" clause is unconstitutionally retroactive under
a higher standard of judicial review depends on a balance of public and
private interest factors. Relevant public interest factors are the speedy
implementation of a comprehensive regulatory scheme and the recognition
of valid rights outstanding at enactment. The "hammer" clause recognizes
the former interest at the expense of the latter. Congress recently avoided
a "hammer" type clause in enacting the Coal Leasing Amendments of
1975 in order to expressly protect valid existing rights. The conference
committee giving birth to the "hammer" clause did not explain why the
public interest in recognizing valid exisitng rights was sacrificed in the
reclamation legislation.
Congress' decision not to recognize the rate setting terms of nonamended contracts is problematic for two reasons. First, Congress was
advised by the Comptroller General that project participants have vested
rights in the terms of water service contracts. Second, these vested rights
are against the Congress itself. The "hammer" clause sets a dangerous
precedent of Congress legislating to modify the terms of its own contracts.
The "hammer" clause is also arguably unconstitutional under the conventional "rational relationship" standard of judicial review. The clause's
retroactive application of leasing restrictions is unreasonably severe because Congress overestimated the project benefits to be distributed in
farmland leasing markets and the portion of those benefits captured by
tenants.
The "hammer" clause itself may have a mitigated impact, however.
Large irrigators, who will probably be hit the hardest by the clause, may
be able to amend their contracts without coming under the restrictive
leasing provisions of the RRA by using leasing substitutes condoned by
Bureau regulations and restructuring their business organizations to profit
from more favorable treatment of other types in the regulations.

